Why is the West lenient towards Serbia?
When Bismarck’s Germany, Austro-Hungarian and the Russian Empire signed the Berlin Memorandum in 1876, by which they sided with the Christian rebels in Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and stood against the Ottoman authorities, the British authorities reacted angrily. Berlin, Vienna and Russia offered a solution to the crisis, without consulting London or respecting its interests. Explaining the reasons for his dissatisfaction, British Prime Minister at that time Benjamin Disraeli said to the Russian Minister Gorchakov: “England is treated here as if we were Montenegro or Bosnia.”
Almost a century and a half later, the same principle seems to be in effect. Decisions can be made about Montenegro, Bosnia and Kosovo without them, but they cannot be made without big powers. This is the essence of the message that the special American envoy Gabriel Escobar sent to Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti a few days ago, after the latter questioned the credibility of Miroslav Lajcak, the main European negotiator for resolving the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo.
Escobar said that, despite Kurti’s demands, Lajcak will remain in the negotiations, and that the dialogue will continue. “I don’t think,” he added, “that a country with a million and a half inhabitants will be able to convince the transatlantic community, which numbers 700 million people, to change its tactics.”
At the very beginning of the war in Ukraine, the United States and the European Union intensified the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, taking a pro-Serbian position. The US and EU demanded from the Kosovo authorities to form a community of Serbian municipalities.
Many were surprised by the policy of Washington and Brussels, because, for example, Kosovo took a pro-Ukrainian position from the very beginning of the war in Ukraine, while Serbia remained the only country in Europe, along with Belarus, that did not impose sanctions on Moscow.
The strong pro-Ukrainian position of Pristina, as well as Sarajevo and Podgorica, probably helped Serbia more than they themselves. From the moment when the Russian invasion began, the Western public emphasized that the Western Balkans is a vulnerable region, to which, thanks to Russian influence on Serbian politics, the conflict could be transferred.
Not wanting to spend their security resources (above all NATO assets) on containing Serbia, and wanting to preserve peace at any cost, Washington and Brussels decided to politically contain Pristina, Podgorica and Sarajevo.
It is clear that Kosovo, BiH and Montenegro harbored irrational hopes regarding the war in Ukraine. Namely, the sovereignist elites in these countries believed that the war in Ukraine was a chance to free themselves from Serbian influence. They neglected one important thing. It is almost irrelevant to Western policy makers what these three small states think about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, because none of them sends significant amounts of weapons, nor financial support, like Germany or the Netherlands.
When everything is taken into account, the only way the Western Balkans can influence the war in Ukraine is to go to war here as well, and that, in addition to Ukraine, the USA and the EU must deal with another front.
Avoiding this scenario became, from the first day of the Russian invasion, an absolute priority for the West. Just as Russia’s interest from the beginning is to open a second front in the Balkans, in order to burden the Americans and Europeans with additional worries, while relieving themselves in Ukraine.
In this situation Serbia has a central role, because it is the only country with enough military strength and enough open issues with its neighbors (primarily with Kosovo) to go to war. Of course, even in a situation when the West is preoccupied with Ukraine, it would not be wise for Serbia to start a war, but in times of major crises, the authorities often take steps that do not turn out to be wise in the end. That is why Americans and Europeans did not want to leave anything to chance.
Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, American and European diplomats have been making concessions to Serbia, with the aim of appeasing it and convincing it that it can pursue its interests in the region peacefully and with the support of the West. Of course, Serbia was not offered everything it wanted (annexation of northern Kosovo, Republika Srpska and Montenegro), which would also threaten peace. Instead, Serbia was offered to have more influence in neighboring countries through peaceful means.
In Montenegro and BiH, with the support of the international community, Djukanović, Izetbegovic and Komsic were removed from power, because they were in sharp opposition to Belgrade’s aspirations to dominate the region.
Furthermore, after the last elections, as BiH Defense Minister Zukan Helez admitted, there was an option to form the Council of Ministers with the opposition in Republika Srpska, but the SDP leadership still chose to form a coalition with Dodik, after the latter “promised the international community that they will cooperate”.
In this context, it should be recalled that Aleksandar Vucic pointed out that he received a promise from representatives of the international community that the state property would be “returned” to the Republika Srpska.
Finally, in addition to the US and EU continuing to pressure the Kosovo authorities to form the Association of Serb Municipalities, Escobar at one point openly threatened Kurti that he would be replaced with someone more cooperative.
If we have in mind all this, and take a look at the attack by a paramilitary group on the Kosovo police in Banjska, then situation becomes clearer.
The Kosovo police announced that they found documents with the arrested members of the Banjska Group, which link them to Milan Radoicic, Vucic’s key man in the north of Kosovo. Vucic was very interested in arming this and similar groups in the north, because Serbia can count on the support of the West, only as long as it represents a credible threat to peace and neighboring countries.
In this sense, the statement of the President of Serbia is quite indicative, in which he legitimizes the rebellion of the Banjska Group and reveals that the danger of war is his main argument in the negotiations with the West: “Although I warned every day, both in Brussels and in New York, that all this [attack in Banjska] could happen, few wanted to hear and listen. Serbs, and not people from central Serbia, as they lied in the Pristina media, but people from Kosovo and Metohija rebelled, not wanting to suffer Kurti’s terror anymore.”
The fact that the Kosovo police forces, without the help of KFOR, managed to eliminate or arrest part of the Banjska group (but not all of them) represents a relative victory for Kurti, i.e. a humiliation for Vucic, who justifies his decision not to retaliate by using force that “Kurti is trying to drag Serbia into a conflict with the NATO alliance”.
Bearing in mind that he is under pressure from the pro-Russian right, Vucic may still have to find a way to use force against Kosovo’s structures and restore his credibility, which he suggested in the closing words of his presentation: “Ours is to exhaust everything we can so that there is no greater of bloodshed. It’s up to us to try to keep the peace, but if anyone thinks that… [Long pause.] It doesn’t matter, about then-then, when we make a decision we’ll let you know.”
If Pristina, Sarajevo and Podgorica were convinced that the war in Ukraine was their chance to realize their interests, now it is quite clear that the war in Ukraine is a chance for Serbia and Serbian politics in the region in general. Bosniaks, Albanians and Montenegrins are on the political defensive, and the Serbs are on the offensive.
There is no doubt that Vucic, through Radoicic in the north of Kosovo and Dodik in BiH, will continue to express credible threats to peace, so that he can “save the peace” in the manner of Milosevic at the negotiations in Brussels and New York, putting demands before Western diplomats and those who are completely subordinate to them. ruling structures in the region (in which only Kurti does not belong, because he skilfully combines opposition to the international community and cooperation with it).
The job of diplomats like Escobar and Lajcak is to use the American-European influence in Sarajevo, Podgorica and Pristina to enforce peace, without using the resources of the NATO alliance and jeopardizing the safety of KFOR soldiers, especially after two KFOR soldiers, following protests in Zvecan, amputated legs.
As it was a century and a half ago, Western diplomacy is torn between two conflicting aspirations, which can perhaps best be illustrated by the two assessments at the beginning of the aforementioned Bismarck. According to him, the Balkans “is not worth the bones of any Pomeranian grenadier”, but at the same time he was aware that “one day a big war in Europe could break out because of some stupidity in the Balkans”.
