It is possible to build “mutual understanding” with Dodik, as much as with Putin
Former British ambassador to the US and NATO David Manning and Tony Blair’s chief of cabinet Jonathan Powell published — on the occasion of anniversary of Russian aggression against Ukraine — an article that can be very useful for understanding what is going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially when we talk about the actions of the “international community”.
In the article titled How to contain a recalcitrant Russia, two authors remind us of an almost mystical coincidence: on February 22 1946 George Kennan, then a diplomat in the American embassy in Moscow sent the famous “Long Telegram” to Washington. Warning his government that the time of cooperation with the Kremlin is gone for good, Kennan notes observations that will become the basis of American politics towards the Soviet Union until the fall of the Berlin wall.
Among other things, Kennan explains to his government that the Kremlin has “a neurotic view of the world” which is based on a “deep-rooted sense of insecurity”. Russian autocrats, he says, know that their way of ruling is obsolete, fragile, and artificial, and is unsustainable in comparison to or in contact with Western political systems.
Soviets are, says Kennan, aware that they are weaker compared to the West, and that “their success depends upon the level of unity, determination, and robustness of the Western world”. Because of that, Stalin is strongly convinced that “Soviet as well as efforts of Russian friends abroad should set as a goal a deepening and exploitation of differences [within West]”.
Using influential communist parties all across Europe, Stalin sowed polarization in Western nations and between them. As the unity of the West weakened, thanks to the malignant Russian influence or some other factors, Stalin was more convinced in the Marxist idea of the “decline of decadent Bourgeois world”.
As Stalin once, Putin has during recent years strongly encouraged division in the Euro-Atlantic community, ensuring himself and others that the “decadent West truly is falling apart “. The actions of Russian authorities were not the only cause for disintegration processes, but to them, they suited best.
Brexit and Euroscepticism in general; the crisis of EU and NATO integration; populist movements that polarised Western society; Macron’s respectively traditional French skepticism towards functionality of NATO; French-German ambition for “strategic autonomy of Europe” and the idea that the dependence of Europe on US will diminish if EU improves its economic and political cooperation with Russia, etc.
Besides disintegration processes, Western reputation has been diminished also by unpreparedness to reply by force to Russian aggression on Georgia in 2008, as to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The last major event, that ensured Putin that the West is falling apart and that it will not have the will to oppose Russia, was the debacle of the United States in Afghanistan and the humiliating retreat in 2021.
Manning and Powell state that Putin, observing and encouraging said processes, concluded that the West is falling apart and that it will do nothing to protect Ukraine. Although it was false, the image of a weak West that is falling apart contributed to Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.
“ Ukraine is a reminder of how critical it is both to maintain western unity and to advertise it loudly to potential adversaries. […] It is essential to prove him wrong — not just for the sake of the Ukrainians but for ours too. Putin’s appetite grows with the eating: first, parts of Georgia, then Crimea, then the Donbas region. If he occupies Ukraine, who will be next: the Moldovans, the Balts, the Finns, the Poles?”, write Manning and Powell.
The West has to, they add, demonstrate its cohesion, and with that, it will demonstrate its strength, undermine the image Putin spreads of it, and discourage Russian to make new attacks. “We have to suppress Putin’s efforts to spread regional instability, no matter if it is Syria, Balkans or Sahel”, conclude authors.
It seems that in this context, outlined by British diplomats, one needs to understand a whole lot of diplomatic initiatives to solve misunderstandings in different parts of Europe. Thanks to strong American pressure, Great Britain and the EU are finally close to an agreement regarding the status of Northern Ireland, after Brexit, and Serbia and Kosovo are also close to an agreement to normalize relations.
Also, Washington works strongly with Turkey on approving the entrance of Finland and Sweden, with it additionally strengthening the image of the cohesion of West. The American president has, in several press conferences, stated that “Putin wanted Finlandisation of NATO instead of getting NATO-station of Finland, along Sweden ‘’.
If concludes successfully above mentioned disputes (UK-EU, Serbia-Kosovo, Turkey-Sweden), the Euro-Atlantic community will demonstrate its cohesion and destroy the image of the “dissolution of West” which has encouraged the Kremlin to become more and more aggressive.
It seems that part of this “cohesive diplomatic initiative” of the West is also the current action of the “international community” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, led by the American embassy.
One of the strategic places, where the Kremlin implemented its policy of proving the “dissolution of the West ‘’ was Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Since 2007 Milorad Dodik started openly to get close to Moscow, which encouraged him more and more to stop the NATO path of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then to question the authority of the West and its “heritage”. Dodik has been undermining OHR, the Constitutional Court and reforms led by Western and pro-Bosnian structures, in the period from 1997 until 2006. The goal of these reforms — such as establishing united Armed Forces of BiH — was to strengthen the state level, on the entity’s cost.
Apart from what suited the Kremlin — a local leader undermined the authority and credibility of the West — a state of almost constant crisis and instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after 2006., was to Putin’s diplomats an excellent argument in favor of the thesis that “West is falling apart”: if West cannot solve problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Western protectorate”, how is going to solve them elsewhere (where it doesn’t have its troops or Office if High Representative)? At the same time, Moscow, along with Banja Luka, claimed that the West with its interventionism to strengthen state structures “in favor of Bosniaks”, actually produced problems.
Russia has by putting pressure on OHR tried to discourage the West to continue with interventionism and to strengthen the BiH statehood, and once Russians succeeded significantly, they — ironically — blamed the West for the newly created condition, blaming its early “anti-Serbian action”.
When talking about Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union carries historical responsibility, because the EU gave crucial support to Russia in dispute on OHR’s part, respectively in strengthening the state and weakening the entity.
Back in 2007, OHR has — with the Lajcak’s amendments — tried to prevent blockades in the joint structures (Council of Ministers and the Parliament) to improve BiH autonomous functionality. But in the end, Lajcak revoked his amendments. He did it, not because Russia asked him to but because Brussels supported Russia in that request.
At the same time, when that was happening [2007], then the German minister of foreign affairs, now president Frank Walter-Steinmeier wrote: “Russia is an irreplaceable partner of strategic importance for the EU. Pan-European peace order and permanent solution to important projects, from the Balkans to the Middle East, can be accomplished only with Russia, not at all without her or against her”.
Brussels, respectively Berlin, as if had then made a deal with Moscow, by which Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the interest sphere, with a 50–50 ratio. Distancing the EU from the United States, in Peace Implementation Council, getting close to Russia was a frightful demonstration of the “dissolution of West”.
The narrative of Berlin and Moscow about “strengthening local stakeholders” and the ‘’consensus principle’’ didn’t bring stability, but did stop the reform process. Bosnia and Herzegovina was 2006 ahead of Croatia, on a European path, and today our European perspective is almost dead. Interests of the Great-Serbian project matched perfectly with the interests of Moscow: Putin encouraged Dodik to make crises, to undermine the credibility of the West, and Dodik made crises, to — in a manner of self-fulfilling prophecy — prove how Bosnia and Herzegovina is “not functional” and ‘’unsustainable’’.
The specified condition changed, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the exclusion of Russia from the Peace Implementation Coundil in Bosnia. It was expected that the West will remove Dodik from power, by supporting the opposition in RS. That didn’t happen. It remains vague whether that is because of the opposition’s inability, or the West’s uncertainty (or both).
Either way, after the elections, Americans decided to apply a different strategy: it seems, they decided to weaken Dodik by removing his opponents in Sarajevo (SDA and DF). Maybe their logic was — “it takes two to tango”. If there is no one to oppose Dodik, the condition will settle down, at least temporarily. That is, it seems, American logic in this case.
Dodik has, after 15 years, received support in the elections, thanks to a narrative that “political Sarajevo’’ is a threat to the survival of Republika Srpska, which survives thanks to the agility of Dodik and his party.
When a few days ago, Dodik called Troika an “invalid structure”, he explained in a way why Americans supported it: because they also believe Troika is ‘’invalid structure’’.
Troika will not only not oppose Dodik. It cannot. It doesn’t have the strength. Its participation in power depends on Dodik himself, clearly visible from the election of Kemal Ademovic in the Collegium of House of Peoples (with the critical support of SNSD).
Logically, if Troika is indeed an “invalid structure” (and it is), then it is not a threat to the survival of Republika Srpska. That means that Dodik is left ‘’without a job’’. Because why would anybody defend her if no one is threatening her? Dodik’s victory is also his defeat.
Of course, this situation doesn’t suit the president of Republika Srpska. Maybe because of that he noted it. Maybe he humiliates Troika to provoke them, so they would react strongly.
Troika swallowed this insult, which is not good for Dodik, it is not good for Troika either, because it has to a considerable extent lost public trust. And if it continues to take the humiliation, reputation of Troika will get even worse. In a situation like this, politics of resistance and patriotic pride will get stronger, illustrated by Izetbegovic’s “important clarification’’ in Belgrade, or Komsic’s speech on March 1st.
With Dodik it is not possible to build ‘’ mutual understanding’’ as much as with Putin. So, isn’t the narrative of Elmedin Konakovic equally inconclusive as is failed politics of European Putin-Verstehers, champions of quality a la Merkel?
Whether leading nuclear power or association of Serb municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an autocrat survives thanks to fear of his nation as an outside enemy. That is the key integrative factor of the autocratic community. If there is no outside enemy, inevitably other questions are being raised, for instance, Dodik’s and his family’s wealth.
Maybe it does take two to tango, but for the crisis, it takes only one: Dodik. He needs a crisis like he needs air or food. Although Troika did everything to please him, Dodik continued being himself. Furthermore, in some dimensions, he became even worse. For instance, for the first time, he threatened that RS will abandon the European path, as it did with NATO.
The West has an absolute interest to create cohesion or at least an image of cohesion in BiH. Because, the continuation of the crisis in BiH is also a sign of the weakness of the West itself, and it ruins its reputation.
Sooner or later, Washington will realize that Dodik will not change, even if Toika continues to appease him. The Americans probably realize that already, so they perhaps insist on the ‘’invalid structure’’ in Sarajevo, to weaken Dodik’s narrative and prepare the ground to remove him eventually.
Encouraging only conflict among Bosniaks cannot be the basis for stability in BiH. Leaders of the Troika cannot convince anybody that making progress is enough for the ‘’Bosniaks shareholders’’ to change their behavior because that sadly is not the truth.
It shouldn’t be forgotten that the “golden age of reforms” in BiH was not during Alliance for Changes [project similar to Troika], but after: when together with Americans, OHR, SDA, SBiH [Haris Silajdzic’ party], and often with the support of the SDP in opposition, a path was made for European integration and additional state’s institutions, such as Armed Forces, Indirect Tax System, were established.
That was the time when Brussels followed the politics of Washington and not Moscow. If the war in Ukraine exhausts Russia and eliminates its influence in the European Union for a while, then there is a chance for BiH to continue its Euro-Atlantic integration, with all probosnian factors and those are Washington and the majority of parties in ‘’political Sarajevo’’.
(Article was originally published in Bosnian on Istraga.ba)
