Haris Imamović: Why settling accounts with Dodik is better than dialogue

There are two dominant views of the current crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While doves are calling for a dialogue with Milorad Dodik, others believe that an escalation is necessary.

Dovish approach

Let’s take a closer look at how the arguments of both sides sound. We can start from the interpretation of the very cause of the crisis. Doves, such as Kasim Trnka, believe that the responsibility for the beginning of the crisis lies with the OHR. At the moment when “the European path was strengthened, an almost sabotage action followed to try to stop that European path”, Trnka assessed.

A similar view was expressed by Enver Kazaz, a political analyst close to the ruling Social-democratic party. “Schmit’s imposition of the Electoral Law at the moment when BiH won the opening of negotiations with the EU is completely controversial and very harmful to the progress of BiH on the further (!) European path,” Kazaz said.

He added that “the USA is clearly behind Schmidt”, and that Americans are “crushing Dodik”.

Although he is rooting for the fall of the president of the RS, Kazaz said that he does not consider it a viable option, because “we do not have the instruments to implement Schmidt’s decision in the RS”.

Therefore, with the Schmidt’s decision, as predicted by Kazaz, Dodik will not be weakened, but strengthened.

SDP President Nermin Nikšić, in his variant of the soft approach, said that Schmidt’s decision “will certainly slow down the European path”.

He also explained that he supports the content of the decision, as well as Schmidt’s right to amend the Electoral Law, but — as if paying special attention to the SNSD and HDZ — he underlined that he is not happy that such an outcome has come about.

“We have to be aware of the fact that the compromise was not possible without Dodik and Čović. No matter how much we tried, they also had to be part of the same story, which we finished in order to get the opening of negotiations,” said Nikšić.

In the end, the European Commission indirectly condemned Schmidt’s move, stressing in its reaction that the Bonn powers should be used “only as a measure of last resort against irreparable unlawful acts”.

In other words, according to the Commission, Schmidt can only act reactively, say, to annul unconstitutional regulations passed by the RS authorities.

He should not act proactively, as in this case, by improving the Electoral Law.

A completely different assessment was given by the US Embassy, ​​as well as the US Assistant Secretary of State Jim O’Brien, and the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the German and Dutch embassies, which felt the need to announce themselves with special announcements and, in a certain way, distance themselves from the assessment of the European Commission.

Hawkish approach

The US Embassy unreservedly welcomed the High Representative’s decision, stressing that “it is vital to ensure that the elections are free and fair”, and their position was reinforced by O’Brien, who said: “We reaffirm our full support for the High Representative and his use of the Bonn Powers.”

A similar statement was issued by the British and German embassies, as well as the special envoy of the German government for the Western Balkans, Manuel Sarrazin.

The Dutch ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Henk van den Dool, evaluated Schmidt’s move as fulfilling one of the 14 key priorities, which were put before Bosnia and Herzegovina on the European path.

After the National Assembly of the RS adopted the conclusions challenging the decision of the OHR, there was an additional, even more significant reaction from the US Embassy, ​​in which was emphasized that these conclusions are a direct attack on the Dayton Agreement.

For the Americans, the source of the crisis is not in Schmidt’s move, but in inappropriate reactions from the RS.

At the end of the statement, they said in a threatening tone that the US “will continue to use the tools at our disposal to address anti-Dayton actions”.

The announcement was made when BiH the media was flooded with details about the closure of the bank accounts of RS officials, members of Dodik’s family and companies close to the regime, such as Integral Engineering.

A significant part of political commentators supported the stated, hawkish approach.

The editor of the Klix portal Semir Hambo assessed that Dodik is aware that if he starts escalating with the international coalition of the willing gathered around the USA, he will face consequences that “could be much more serious” than before.

He recalled the strong effect produced by the bank accounts closure in the RS, as well as the fact that there is already a criminal trial against Dodik for non-compliance with the decisions of the OHR.

Jasmin Mujanović gave a similar assessment, saying that “there is a chance now, for instance, to finish off Dodik but it reqs confrontation not compromise”.

He added that Dodik is “weak and fearful”. “Vital he be given no off ramps now”, he said.

Mujanović added that “the minor pushback from US & their ensuing panic is proof of how easily D&C can be dealt with when there is the political will to do so.”

Have you noticed that Dodik has changed?

Exactly one year ago, when the Americans were still optimistic about the newly formed coalition at the state level, I wrote: “Sooner or later Washington will realize that Dodik will not calm down, even if the Troika gives in to him.”

I left it as an open possibility that the Americans were already aware of this at the time, and that they would begin to remove him, after it became clear to everyone that Dodik would not de-radicalize his policy.

Analysts, such as Žarko Papić or the aforementioned Enver Kazaz, gave a completely different assessment.

Papić then noticed that Dodik had changed. “Do you notice a change in Dodik? Suddenly, he is very open to cooperation with Bosniaks in the RS,” he said.

Kazaz shared with the public that he feels hope for a better life for citizens from Dayton. “There are no more radical Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović. The formation of the government was approached in a different way,” he concluded.

Perhaps Kazaz and Papić still think that the opening of negotiations with the EU is proof that SNSD and HDZ have really changed, and that their optimism has proven to be justified.

I think that the aforementioned interpretation would be illusory, and I agree with the American Embassy’s assessment that progress on the European road “was achieved despite, not thanks to, Dodik”.

Even if there was a certain readiness within the SNSD for dialogue, it proved to be insufficient, and was certainly the result of fear of the Biden administration and the tactical postponement of escalation, i.e. waiting for the American elections and Trump’s eventual victory.

What next?

Will the Americans remove Dodik, after concluding that he has not changed (as I wished a year ago)?

Or is Kazaz right, when he says: “I support Dodik’s fall, but this [Schmidt’s intervention] is not a way to make Dodik fall, but to strengthen him.”

I do not know.

I would not dare to claim — as Kazaz did — that the aforementioned crisis will certainly strengthen Dodik.

Nor that, in the coming period, he will certainly be removed (by, for example, being convicted of disobeying the decisions of the OHR, and dismissed and eventually arrested, if he does not accept the court verdict).

In the book How States Think, Sebastian Rosato and John Mearsheimer say that the world of (international) politics is characterized by radical uncertainty, and that policymakers are always in an information deficit.

The only way to conduct a rational policy in such an uncertain environment is to rely on credible theories.

Rosato and Mearsheimer point out that even such an approach is not a guarantee that you will be successful, but there is less chance of failure if you rely on a credible, instead of a non-credible theory.

Non-credible theories about the future development of events are, as a rule, imbued with optimism.

Rosato and Mearsheimer cite the example of Chamberlain’s “peaceful” unwillingness to increase military capacity after the Nazis came to power in 1933; or the blind faith of the Bush administration that, after the overthrow of Saddam’s tyranny, Iraq would be quickly and easily democratized.

In our context, a deeply unreliable theory is that Dodik and Čović are ready for dialogue and compromise, on a voluntary basis. In other words, they have to be forced to do it.

But even then, they will find ways to avoid a constructive dialogue, which is confirmed by the Americans’ assessment that the opening of negotiations with the EU happened despite, and not thanks to Dodik. Čović’s attitude towards the Southern Interconnection is similar.

That’s why I consider the calls of Nermin Nikšić, the EU Delegation in Sarajevo, as well as analysts like Papić and Kazaz to continue with the policy that has been in place for the past year, to be missed, and I support the willingness of the American government to take a different path.

I don’t know if this change will lead to the removal of Dodik, but the wave of sanctions will certainly not strengthen him.

In any case, settling accounts with Dodik is a much better policy than the status quo, while creating the illusion of progress.

The worst Biden is better for us than the best Trump

In the coming period, we are expecting (at least) two important events on the international level.

The first is the announced summer offensive of Russian forces in Ukraine, and the second will be the American elections, in which Donald Trump has a good chance of winning.

At one of the regular sessions organized in Belgrade by intellectuals close to Dodik, Đuro Bilbija said: “The Russian world is a prerequisite for the establishment of the Serbian world, and the prerequisite for the establishment of the Russian world is the victory of Russia in the war against Ukraine, that is, the defeat of the West in Ukraine.”

Nenad Kecmanović made a similar assessment, saying that the West is in a hurry to discipline the Serbs before Russia arrives at the crossroads of the Danube.

In other words, Kecmanović’s (and Dodik’s) hopes are tied to the Russian advance.

With the eventual collapse of Ukraine, there is also a huge danger if Trump returns to the White House.

His first mandate was marked by the complete passivity of the American Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We can be critical of some of the moves of the current ambassador Michael Murphy, but he is by all parameters many times more agile and better than his predecessor, the rather invisible Eric Nelson.

The reason is not only in the difference between the two personalities, but in the support they had in Washington.

If we consider that the potential candidate for Trump’s secretary of state is Richard Grenell, who openly supports the regional agenda of the Greater Serbian establishment, then Trump’s new mandate could be even more dangerous for BiH than the first.

We should not forget that Dodik previously announced that he would declare secession in the event of Trump’s victory.

I have no doubts that Dodik has reconciled to a certain extent in the previous years. And that he is ready to reconcile until the American elections, if only to wait politically alive for new geopolitical circumstances.

Those who, like the pundits close to the Troika, do not understand this, and optimistically believe that with Dodik stability shold be built and BiH should slowly move forward (until the American presidential elections), are grossly mistaken.

I am convinced that the Biden administration, worried about the mentioned dangers, started to settle accounts with Dodik. The US undoubtedly has enough power to weaken and even remove Dodik before the upcoming US elections.

The only question is whether they will have enough determination, and if they do, how much they will be distracted by Dodik’s European friends, as well as some domestic forces.

We should not forget that back in January, the Americans asked Schmidt to impose changes to the Election Law, but thanks to the cooperation of the Troika and the EU, several months were lost.

In any case, it is necessary to use as much as possible the remaining ten months of Biden’s mandate, and the support that Ambassador Murphy has in DC, primarily in the person of James O’Brien, in order to remove Dodik or at least weaken him as much as possible.

It is the best way to prepare this country for the very uncertain period ahead.

Everything else, and by that I mean above all the creation of the illusion that progress is possible with Dodik, represents an existential danger for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

If we can’t help the Americans much, let’s not give them back. And we can help them.